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Abstract 
The Islam Defense Action in Jakarta during November to December 2016 was the largest protest movement that ever 
been held in Indonesia and brought national concerns over political instability. Hundred of thousands to millions of 
people overwhelmed the streets protesting the alleged blasphemy on Islam by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a candidate for 
the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election that has a close connection to President Joko Widodo. This article analyzes the 
outbreak of the protest movement as a depiction of the strategic influence of Islamic groups in the midst of political 
upheaval threat. The protest movement showed a struggle to defend their values, but on the other hand, its political 
impact cannot be disclaimed. Above all of the phenomena, Islam Defense Action implies that religious sentiment still 
interacts with the politics and challenging the role of Islamic civil society to democratic transition in the post-2014 
Indonesia. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In understanding the relationship between 
religion and politics in Indonesia lately, some 
conditions need to be examined and elaborated 
to describe the complexity of the issues related 
to Islamic movement. This paper scrutinizes the 
dynamic of Islamic civil society in interferring the 
democratic transition in the post-2014. This 
period is interesting to be examined because the 
political tension was getting heat up since some 
Islamic groups consistently criticize the 
government of Joko Widodo or popularly known 
as "Jokowi." The mobilization of mass with a 
strong Islamic symbol was become a new 
prominent opposing power and alarming the 
democratic transition for social political 
fragmentations by religious base. 
The sentiment from some Islamic groups 
toward Jokowi’s government was not suddenly 
arrived. Since the 2014 presidential election 
there were polarization of the two camps of 
candidates. The first candidat, Prabowo-Hatta 
have supporter from Gerindra Party (Partai 
Gerindra), National Mandat Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, PAN), Prosperous Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), National Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), 
Golkar Party (Partai Golkar), and the Crescent 
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Moon Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). The 
second candidate, Jokowi, who is genuine cadres 
of Indonesia Democracy Party of Struggle (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) coupled 
with Jusuf Kalla. They had support from PDIP, 
Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, PKB), National Democrat Party (Partai 
Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem), Hanura Party 
(Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat), and Indonesia Justice 
and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan 
Indonesia, PKPI). Considering the ideological 
background of the mass and the supporting 
parties, we can observe that the Islamic parties, 
such PKS and PPP and Muslim mass-based party, 
the PAN, were at the Prabowo-Hatta camp. 
Meanwhile, the PKB was the only Muslim-based 
parties that existed in the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla’s 
coalition. 
After the 2014 presidential election was over 
and won by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, supporters 
polarization was not necessarily meltdown 
although all the Islamic parties, except PKS, have 
joined the government. Suspicion and cynicism 
from some Islamic groups remained to increase 
as a result of the heat tension of presidential 
election at the mass root that divide Islamic 
purist and the progressives. The disappointment 
of some Islamic groups increasingly sharpened 
when President Jokowi allegedly defend Ahok in 
various legal case. The climax, when Basuki 
Tjahaya Purnama, or known as Ahok, as the 
Governor of Jakarta was purportedly insulting the 
Koran in an official speech at Kepulauan Seribu 
that became viral on social media. Delayed 
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response of the government to the case led 
various Islamic organizations shed his grievance 
with mass demonstrations in Jakarta during 
October to December 2016.  
The event of a protest movement held in 
Jakarta on October 17, 2016, November 4, 2016, 
and December 2, 2016, that involving hundreds 
of thousands to milions of people from various 
Islamic groups. The action is known as The Islam 
Defense Action (Aksi Bela Islam), which demand 
justice for alleged defamation committed by 
Ahok, the incumbent candidate for 2017 Jakarta 
gubernatorial election. He and Djarot were 
supported by PDIP, Nasdem Party, Golkar Party, 
and Hanura. On another side, the challengers 
come from Agus Yudhoyono-Silvyana (Democrat 
Party, PKB, PPP, PAN) and Anis Baswedan-
Sandiaga (Gerindra Party and PKS). Looking at the 
party’s coalition composition, it is easily to 
predict that the crisscrossing of religious and 
politics as happened in presidential election 
would reappear in Jakarta gubernatorial. At this 
level, the protest movement, whether intentional 
or not, could interfere Jakarta gubernatorial 
process that put Ahok in less fortunate position.  
During the demonstration, the protesters 
conducted peacefully act that in general still 
following the corridor of law and democratic 
values. However, the abundant of mass who 
joined the protest were terrified the government. 
When milions of people overwhelmed the 
streets, the situation could be politically 
dangerous and put the government regime at a 
great risk. As Porta & Diani [1] stated, the 
disruption of daily routines increases with 
numbers directed to the regime’s ability to 
control crowds inevitably suffers as they grow 
larger. Jokowi then responded with conducting 
intensive meeting with some major party leaders, 
key Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Indonesia 
Ulema Board (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) as 
well as Indonesia’s main military forces. A set of 
circumstances that depict national stability was 
at stake. 
The political dynamics and religious 
sentiment around the Islam Defence Action 
highlighted the role of Islamic civil society to 
perform a counterbalancing power to meet their 
demand. Ironically, the movement’s impact on 
the practical politics cannot be avoided and the 
positive role of Islamic civil society to democratic 
transition is in challenge. Civil society is a number 
of organizations or institutions who asserted the 
people's interests. The main characteristics of 
civil society is in its sphere that located between 
the family and the state, enjoyed autonomy from 
the state and driven by the volunteerism of the 
members of the community [2]. In a democratic 
political system, civil society became an 
important element because it provides a vehicle 
to articulate and promote the interests of the 
people dealing with the state and the 
government that are likely to be influenced by 
market forces and political elites.  
The development of civil society in religious 
community experiencing a little paradox. Civil 
society was originally formed to oppose the 
regime who hold divinity ruling [3]. However, 
religious organizations eventually play a political 
role in the public sphere [4]. In the context of 
Muslim contries, the Islamic activism and Islamic 
movement is differentiated from political Islam. 
The earlier concentrated in non-state realm, 
religiocivil community, and ideological basis, 
while the later has a clear political goals [5]. 
Interestingly, the Islam Defence Action serve in 
between nonstate realm and political ends 
dimension. Through a protest movement, the 
Islamic organizations was not only struggle to 
convey a message to the government as well as 
public that can be seen explicitly or implicitly [6], 
but also could play a crucial role to determine the 
pole of political power in a winding manner. 
There are some questions need to be answered 
in this article regarding the phenomenon. First, 
how Islamic civil society in Indonesia faced a 
demanding situation when they are trying to 
maintain a strategic political position? Second, 
what is the significance of the Islam Defence 
Movement to the practical politics both at local 
(Jakarta) and national level?  
 
MATERIAL AND METHOD 
The analysis of this article was built by 
qualitative approach that used literature study 
combined with news investigation. Comparative 
historical explanation emphasized to the period 
before 2014 and after 2014 in order to construct 
analytical framework about how the Islamic civil 
society interact with democracy in Indonesia 
political context. The elaboration will be 
presented in the first part of discussion. In the 
second part, the social base and ideology of party 
analysis is used to explain on how the new 
emerging power of Jokowi and his Nationalist-left 
party, PDIP, was responded by some Islamic civil 
organizations and in turn shaping political 
contest in the post 2014 election. The third 
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discussion will examine how the Islamic mass 
actions against the allegedly Islam blasphemy 
depict the crisscrossing of politics and religion 
around the Jakarta gubernatorial that associate 
with broader political contest. 
 
Data Collection  
The data collected through documents from 
previous research that relevant with Islamic civil 
society and democracy in Indonesia discourse. 
The information about the event of The Islam 
Defence Action was retrieved from online news 
and particular Islamic organization’s webiste 
during October to December 2016. The event 
information from news also complement other 
discussion with broader time period. However, to 
keep the objectivity of information from agency. 
The news were selected if it displayed in two or 
three main news agencies that has no 
substantive differentiation regarding the content 
but only one presented as a reference. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Islamic Civil Society and Democracy in Indonesia 
In the Indonesian context, the rise of Islamic 
civil society is influenced by several factors. First, 
the increased of economic growth, especially in 
the era of the New Order. Secondly, the rise of 
the middle class. Third, the rise of Islamic 
movements, and forth, the increasing demands 
for democratization. These four factors are also 
driven by economic globalization and the rapid 
use of information technology [7]. The Indonesia 
economic growth happened in the 1980s due to 
rising oil prices increase the surplus for the 
country. It made the society's welfare got 
improved which in turn also affects the growth of 
the middle class. However, the attitude of the 
Suharto regime against the Islamic groups was 
more influenced by the principle of utility-
oriented for their power protection. Therefore, 
the relationship of the New Order regime with 
Islamic groups continue to experience ups and 
downs. In 1973, the New Order regime united all 
political parties into three major parties to be 
more easily controlled. Various Islamist parties 
like Muslim Party of Indonesia (Parmusi), NU 
Party (Partai Nahdlatul Ulama), and The Unity of 
Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) were fused into the 
PPP. The parties of the left-wing, nationalist, and 
Christian were incorporated in the PDI. While the 
regime themselves formed a Golkar as a political 
vehicle that embodied the elements of the 
military and other regime supporters. In the 
1990s, as some of the prominent army elites 
started less support the New Order regime, 
Suharto turned his attention to the conservative 
Islamic groups, including encouraging the 
formation of the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim 
Indonesia, ICMI) to gain political support (Liddle 
1996). 
There are two largest civil organizations and 
become mainstream in the referral community in 
Indonesia, namely the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah. In the New Order era, Islamic 
civil society organizations were allowed to 
operate as long as not to promote political Islam 
or challenge the regime's power. However, NU 
and Muhammadiyah have enormous members 
and supporters that making them less subject to 
Suharto's authoritarian approach. For example, 
in 1991, a major figure of NU, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, in a brave manner forming democratic 
forum for protesting the regime intolerance 
toward ethnicity and sectarianism. He also 
criticized the formation of ICMI as the 
manipulative step of Suharto among the Muslims 
[8]. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, 
dozens of Islamic political parties and many 
Islamic civil organizations have emerged. They 
expressed political views openly and freely. Even 
some Muslim organizations did not hesitate to 
tend to be the hardliners and radicals, such as 
Jemaah Islamiyah, Laskar Islam, Laskar Pembela 
Islam, Laskar Jihad, and Laskar Mujahidin 
Indonesia [9]. 
After the reform, various Islamic civil 
organizations play a major role in the dynamics 
of national politics. Almost every government 
regime established close ties with Islamic groups 
and some of them even serve as a support base. 
For example, the Indonesian Islamic Propagation 
Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, 
DDII) and Indonesian Committee for Solidarity 
with the Islamic World (Komite Indonesia untuk 
Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI) provided support 
to the transition government of BJ. Habiebie 
(1998-1999) [9]. The presidency of Abdurrahman 
Wahid in 1999 also favored by the role of a 
central axis that was driven by Islamist 
politicians, mainly from PKB, PAN, PPP, PBB, and 
Justice Party (PK). Those parties are also known 
have mass base from various Islamic 
organizations. Unfortunately, Wahid political 
capital was not enough to hold impeachment of 
the House of Representatives (DPR) in 2001 due 
to the incompetence of his administration [10].  
 60 
 
The Islam Defence Action (Herdiansah, et al.) 
In Megawati’s period (2001-2004), Indonesia 
began facing difficult situation regarding radical 
Islamist groups. After the 9/11 terror attack, 
Megawati expressed sympathy and committed to 
working with the United States to combat 
international terrorism. Nevertheless, Megawati 
step was getting criticism from some Islamic 
groups. They accused Megawati had put 
Indonesia in a position that could be controlled 
by the United States. When the United States 
invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Islamic groups 
hardliners held a demonstration in Jakarta 
rejecting the Bush military act and urged 
Megawati to condemn the invasion. However, 
Megawati refused the demands. The protestors 
accused her of being servant to the United 
States. Since then, the government was 
increasingly considered to have opposite stance 
to the Islamist groups [11]. 
In the era of Yudhoyono’s administration, 
Indonesia challenge a fertile terrorism that 
marked with the second Bali bombings and JW 
Marriot bombing. The ex-jihadist from Poso 
conflict had also spread throughout the country 
and infiltrated radical Islamist groups. However, 
despite Yudhoyono had a military background, he 
did not necessarily rage all of Islamic groups who 
have radical tendency. He also kept the 
perpetuate of military intervention in politics 
minimize. He chose to consolidate civil 
organizations, including the moderate Islamic 
groups to maintain the institutional stability [12]. 
 
Jokowi, Islamic Civil Organization, and Political 
Contest 
Ahead of the 2014 presidential election, there 
was an interesting dynamic of how the 
supporting Islamic groups giving their support to 
the candidates. The presidency candidate 
coalition parties also shaped the support mass 
based on religious communities. The first 
candidate, namely Prabowo and Hatta was 
backed by Gerindra Party, Golkar Party, PAN, 
PKS, and PPP.  All of those parties, except 
Gerindra Party, has a strong Muslim group 
support base. While Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla 
carried by PDIP, Nasdem Party, Hanura, PKPI, and 
PKB. Of all the parties, only the PKB and Jusuf 
Kalla as a person which have strong Muslim 
grassroots support. During the 2014 presidential 
election campaign, the issues relating to religious 
and ideological sarcasm were not seldom raised. 
Jokowi frequently imaged as being anti-Islam, a 
Chinese descent, came from a family of 
communist sympathizers and pretended to be 
Muslim to take part in politics. Those accusations 
reflected a nightmare of some Muslim groups 
about the country's future leader. Black 
campaign about Jokowi scattered through 
various digital media such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and WhatsApp. The results of the 2014 
presidential election then won by Jokowi as 
president and Jusuf Kalla as vice president. 
However, the cleavage of imagined ideologies in 
presidency still affected a mass base support 
when Jokowi was running the government. He 
has a strong supporter mainly from nationalist-
left groups and got a high cynical from purist 
Islamic groups. 
However, after running the government, 
Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla immediately consolidated 
Islamic civil society organizations, especially the 
NU and Muhammadiyah. Some NU cadres 
appointed as ministers in the cabinet, such as 
Khofifah Indar Parawangsa, Lukman Hakim 
Saifuddin, Marwan Ja'far, Imam Nahrawi and 
Dhakiri Muhammad Hanif, Muhammad Nasir, 
Nusron Wahid [13]. while the cadres of 
Muhammadiyah who sits in Jokowi's cabinet are 
Nina Moeloek and Muhajir Effendy. Jokowi did 
not release the importance of support from 
Islamic civil organizations to maintain the 
stability of his government.  
At the beginning of his rule, President Jokowi 
strived to improve the aspect of tolerance 
towards minority communities. The Minister of 
the Interior, Tjahyo Kumolo, imposed civil 
administration law to create fairness for all 
faiths, including local faiths. He then proposed to 
delete the religion column on the citizen's 
identity card [14]. Nevertheless, the effort got 
opposition mainly from conservative Islamic 
groups. For example, NU rejected the plans for 
religion column elimination on identity card 
because it would let people’s freedom go wild. 
According to them, people should choose one of 
the religion that recognized in Indonesia 
constitution [15]. The case has caused 
controversy; they who criticized the plan suspect 
that there was a secularization agenda behind 
President Jokowi policies. Suspicions got higher 
when the celebration of Isra 'Mi'raj on 15 May 
2015, the ministers of religion held a reading of 
the Koran using the tone of Dandang Gulo which 
is one of the songs in Javanese style. Some 
Islamic groups then blasted the practice because 
it did not correspond to either the rules or 
procedure of reading a scripture (tajwid). 
The controversy between the government 
and Islamic groups also continues when Jusuf 
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Kalla suggested that many of mosques misuse 
loudspeakers, so it disrupted other people. In 
June 2015, Jusuf Kalla in his capacity as Chairman 
of the Indonesian Mosque Council asked the 
Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) to discuss this 
mosque loudspeakers problem [16] Jusuf Kalla’s 
statement about the mosque’s loudspeaker was 
getting a lot of resistance from Islamic 
organizations and mosque officials.   
President Jokowi sought to neutralize the 
negative opinion from Islamic groups against 
him. He did safari visits to several Islamic 
boarding schools. In April 2015, Jokowi attended 
boarding schools in Solo and Surabaya. In January 
2016, Jokowi visited boarding schools in Cirebon. 
In June 2016, Jokowi and the first lady attended 
boarding school in Tegal, Central Java. Jokowi 
also kept his promise to establish a national 
santri day the first time on October 22, 2016 that 
held in Serang, Banten. In addition, Jokowi 
supported the inauguration of the International 
Islamic University of Indonesia on June 29, 2016, 
higher education institutions that would be 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs. These efforts indicate that Jokowi 
considers the necessary support from Islamic 
elements to maintain national stability. 
However, a broad trust of Islamic groups 
cannot be built in a short time. In social media 
sphere, the supporters and opponents of Jokowi 
during the 2014 presidential election was still 
engaged in psycho war. It is hard to denied that 
many groups that criticize Jokowi come from 
Islamic communities who’s in the previous 
election tend to support Prabowo-Hatta. They 
involved a variety of debate on the programs 
undertaken by the government. Jokowi 
supporters see the progress of development 
from the positive standpoint and struggle to 
proof that Jokowi is the real people's president 
who can realize his promises. While they who 
consistently criticize the government consider 
Jokowi's programs were filled with intrigues to 
cover the actual failure. 
One issue that became the centre of the 
debate is about the political dynamics of the 
Jakarta government. The heat discourse began 
when Jokowi, the elected governor of Jakarta in 
2012 left the office when he elected as president 
in 2014. The position of Jakarta governor was 
taken over by Ahok who previously served as 
deputy governor. The deputy Jakarta then gave 
to Djarot Saiful, a cadre of PDIP who is close to 
Ahok. Before leaving Jakarta, Jokowi said that he 
would continue to monitor its programs in 
Jakarta, such as the construction of the Mass 
Rapid Transit and monorail. He also promised 
that the various problems such as floods, city 
disorder, traffic jam, and the poverty would be 
more easily overcome when he served as 
president. Nevertheless, the leadership of 
Jokowi-Ahok in Jakarta, leaving legal matters 
related to corruption cases of Jakarta Trans 
projects with a nominal nearly half a trillion 
rupiahs [17].  
One crucial issue in the political context of 
Jakarta politics was the Ahok's attitude that often 
confrontational and aggressive towards 
politicians toward the province parliament (DPRD 
DKI Jakarta). Ahok repeatedly accused the 
legislators as corrupt and interfered with the 
government performance. Inevitably, almost all 
political parties lead to a hostile reaction, 
including Gerindra Party, Ahok former party. At 
the time of the 2014 presidential election, Ahok 
retreat from Gerindra Party because he felt his 
struggles were not in line anymore with the 
party's [18]. In addition to the reason, the 
resignation of Ahok was more determined by his 
decision to anchor his support to Jokowi in the 
2014 presidential election. Automatically, the 
Gerindra Party lost governor position and left the 
power to PDIP dominance and pave the chances 
of victory to Jokowi/PDIP in the 2019 election. Of 
course, Ahok's political maneuver was getting a 
strong reaction from Gerindra Party. 
The allegations of special closeness between 
Jokowi with Ahok increasingly convinced in cases 
of alleged corruption of Sumber Waras. The case 
began on May 12, 2014, when Ahok suddenly 
announced his intention to build a cancer 
hospital, because the two cancer hospitals that 
available were considered inadequate to serve 
the people. Land search was ended up in Sumber 
Waras Hospital. The land purchase by Jakarta 
Provincial Government was reaping problem. The 
sale price offered by the city government judged 
to be unreasonable. The council then advised the 
government to cancel the land purchase. 
However, Ahok stated that the land acquisition 
had no problem and done transparently. The 
Audit Board of Republic of Indonesia (BPK) then 
issued the audit report that reveals the land 
purchase violated the legal procedures. The city 
government land purchase was amounting to Rp. 
755 billion, which is more expensive than the 
original, so it made a loss for the state to Rp.191 
billion [19].  
However, the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 
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KPK) said there was no element of lawlessness 
and state’s budget loss in Sumber Waras case. On 
the statement of the KPK, some politicians 
pointed out that the KPK sided with Ahok. The 
case was then rolled into the political sphere. 
According to Fadli Zon, the Deputy Chairman of 
DPR from Gerindra Party, there were political 
interests that influence the decision of the KPK; 
there were rumours that KPK was reinforced by 
President Jokowi to protect Ahok in the case of 
Sumber Waras [20]. A Protest demanding KPK to 
caught Ahok of the case of Sumber Waras carried 
out by some organizations in April 2016, 
including from Islamic groups in Jakarta, where 
one of them was the Islamic Defenders Front 
(Front Pembela Islam, FPI) [21].  
Public assumptions that Ahok has the special 
relation to Jokowi was highlighted in the case of 
North Coast Jakarta Reclamation. Ahok was 
determined to continue the project after getting 
opposition from the Coordinator Minister for 
Maritime, Rizal Ramli, and the Minister for 
Environment, Siti Nurbaya because the project 
violated the law. Interestingly, the cases 
containing corruption after Sanusi, a member of 
Jakarta Parliament from Gerindra Party, and 
Ariesman, a man of the developer, named as a 
suspect by the KPK. The KPK also monitored 
Sunny Tanuwidjaya, Ahok’s personal assistant 
who also has a family relation to reclamation 
project development company. Coordinating 
Minister for Maritime, Rizal Ramli, then stopped 
the project [22]. Ahok against the decision and 
resulting in the dispute between him and Rizal 
Ramli. This case also got attention from activists 
and various civil organizations, especially among 
fishers and university students. They made 
several demonstrations to reject the Jakarta 
coast reclamation project. However, surprisingly 
Jokowi dethroned Rizal Ramli from his position as 
Coordinating Minister for Maritime in the second 
cabinet reshuffle, and ultimately makes stronger 
allegations about Jokowi partisanship to Ahok. 
 
The Criss-Crossing of Politics and Religion 
Towards the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 
2017, political frictions associated with Jokowi 
and Ahok were getting hotter. Despite the fact 
that Ahok's political capital was weak and face 
various problems, but his performance as Jakarta 
Governor received appreciation from the 
majority of residents. From various surveys, the 
level of satisfaction of the Jakarta's residents 
about Ahok leadership was high. Based on a 
study of the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkar 
Survei Indonesia, LSI), electability of Ahok was 
still the highest at 53 percent in March  2016 
[23]. The survey results of Saiful Mujani Research 
Center in October showed electability Ahok also 
still ahead of approximately 45 percent [24]. 
Although electability of Ahok tended to decrease, 
he was still dominant among the other 
candidates. However, the poor relations with 
political parties make a little late of Ahok 
candidacy. He had even planned to register the 
candidacy through independent channels with 
volunteers group called “Friends of Ahok” 
(Teman Ahok). But in the last-minute of 
candidacy registration to the electoral 
commission, Ahok decided to move forward with 
political party. He was paired with Djarot Saiful, a 
cadre of PDIP, as the deputy candidate. Ahok and 
Djarot were carried by PDIP, Nasdem Party, 
Golkar Party, and Hanura Party. The other pairs 
of candidates are Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga 
Uno promoted by PKS and Gerindra Party, and 
Agus Yudhoyono and Sylviana Murni supported 
by the Democratic Party, PAN, PKB, and PPP. 
Political contest in Jakarta was vulnerable to 
the issue of racism as the background of Ahok is 
a Protestant and descendants of Indonesian 
Chinese. The problem of racism surrounding the 
Jakarta gubernatorial election has begun to 
appear in the response of the community in a 
variety of media, especially social media. Issues 
were developed as a bullet to drop Ahok 
electability among other are the prohibition for 
Muslims in choosing the leader of the infidels and 
the danger of Chinese to dominance Jakarta. 
However, such issues did not interfere 
electability of Ahok. Most of Jakarta residents 
wanted Ahok as the next governor with good 
reason; Ahok performance was considered fulfill 
the citizen's satisfaction. He also perceived as 
successful in making Jakarta much better. 
Unfortunately, the Ahok sympathizers were often 
retaliated their attackers with discourses that 
contain religious scoff. For example, they state 
that it is better led by infidels but clean rather 
than by Muslims but corrupt. Then, Ahok himself 
saying that he was proud to be infidels but not 
corrupt [25]. 
The response that given by Ahok against 
racist attacks even wilder and aggravate the 
political tension. When Ahok was conducting an 
official visit at Kepulauan Seribu on September 
27, 2016, he claimed not to force people to vote 
for him in the elections and called on citizens not 
to be fooled by the parties using verses from the 
Koran (Al-Maidah 51). The speech then became 
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viral in cyberspace and instantly reap public 
reaction [26] On October 7, 2016, Habib Novel 
Chaidir Hasan, a cleric from FPI later sued Ahok 
on suspicion of committing a blasphemous. The 
reaction of Islamic groups for alleged blasphemy 
by Ahok was intensified and expanded. On 
October 10, 2016, Ahok later apologize for his 
statement even though he did not feel guilty for 
what he was not meant insulting Islam. However, 
Islamic groups still did not accept it and plan 
large demonstrations to encourage law 
enforcement to handle Ahok case. Nevertheless, 
the police did not immediately determine the 
suspect status to Ahok because of there was a 
legal procedure that regulates if a candidate 
suspected as law breaking, the law process 
should be postponed until the election is 
completed. However, groups of protesters 
judged that the police had sided with Ahok so 
that the cases must be escorted by the mass 
actions. 
Various protests demanding legal proceedings 
against Ahok not only happened in Jakarta but 
also in other regions, such as in Medan, 
Surabaya, Tegal, Solo, and Sampit. In mid-
October 2016, thousands of people from various 
Islamic civil organizations took to the streets 
condemned the statement Ahok that was 
considered as an insult to the Koran and urged 
the police to imprison Ahok immediately. There 
are pros and cons in the community response to 
whether Ahok did blasphemy. The opposite of 
Ahok believes that the speech of Ahok, 
regardless of any context, have abused the 
Koran, while others consider the remark of Ahok 
was not an insult to the Koran because what he 
meant was the people who use the verses of the 
Koran to incite voters. However, the MUI then 
issued a fatwa that Ahok had conduct a 
blasphemy and made the protest exacerbated.  
A larger and organized demonstrations then 
held in Jakarta on Friday, October 14, 2016. The 
demonstrations were coordinated by FPI and The 
National Movement to Defend Fatwa of 
Indonesia Ulema Council (Gerakan Nasional 
Pengawal Fatwa-MUI, GNPF-MUI). It was 
attended by more than twenty thousand people. 
The events were given the name of the Islam 
Defense Action. They were conducting march and 
rally in front of Jakarta City Hall. The 
demonstrators demanded the police to process 
the case of Ahok [27]. Although it has been doing 
a great demonstration on October 14, the Islamic 
groups were not satisfied and considered the 
legal process was slow so purportedly protected 
by the ruling power. Then, the event of The 
Defence Islam Action was held back a second 
time on November 4, 2016, entitled The Defence 
Islam Action II which requires the police to arrest 
Ahok and set him as suspects in the defamation. 
The demonstration participants consist of 
hundreds of thousands people that gathered at 
the Istiqlal Mosque and moving toward the police 
headquarters, the Presidential Palace, and the 
City Hall. They filled every corner in Patung Kuda 
to Medan Merdeka area. The participants came 
from various regions, such as Bandung, Nusa 
Tenggara Barat, Makassar, Palembang, Maluku, 
Madura, Surabaya, Lampung, and Yogyakarta. 
The leaders of Islamic organizations also joined in 
the protest action, such as KH Abdullah 
Gymnastiar alias Aa Gym, KH Ma'ruf Amin, and 
Habib Rizieq Shihab, KH. Cholil Ridwan (TAPI3), 
KH. Tengku Zulkarnain (MUI), Sukatsyah (Umat 
Islam Bersatu), Nur Akma Diati (PP Forsap FUII), 
Wirawan Adnan (GNPF-MUI), Abdul Rashid 
(Asyafiiyah). Those political leaders who were 
present among others Amien Rais (PAN), Fadli 
Zon (Gerindra Party) and Fahri Hamzah (Vice 
Chairman of DPR from PKS). 
Jokowi said that The Defence Islam Action II 
as an action ridden by political actors aimed at 
creating a political instability. Although not 
explicitly mentioned, these allegations later led 
to the Yudhoyono and Democratic Party which 
carrying Agus-Silvy as a challenger of Ahok-
Djarot. Yudhoyono accused of being the actor 
who rode Islamic mass mobilization on 
November 4, 2016, although later he denied 
through a press conference at his residence [28] 
The accusation clearly stated by Bony Hargens, 
an academician from the University of Indonesia 
known as pro-government analyst. Democrat 
Party then sued him to the police [29]. 
Allegations of President Jokowi further aggravate 
the problem. Islamic groups did not accept that 
they were considered to be driven by certain 
political interest. Along with the heating 
atmosphere, President Jokowi performed 
political safari to the two largest Islamic 
organizations; NU, Muhammadiyah, and to the 
prominent ulema body, MUI. Also, President 
Jokowi conducted a safari to several political 
figures, among others Prabowo, Setya Novanto, 
and Megawati, while the meeting with 
Yudhoyono made by Jusuf Kalla. President Jokowi 
then continued to meet the military elite forces, 
among others are special forces from Indonesian 
Army (Kopassus), Air Force (Paskhas), Navy 
(Marinir), and Indonesian Police (Brimob). The 
 64 
 
The Islam Defence Action (Herdiansah, et al.) 
meeting with the military ranks implying that the 
pressure from Islamic organizations had led to 
the regime of Jokowi insecurity, so he needs to 
strengthen its ranks to make sure the state 
instruments were behind him if the worst 
situation would appear. 
In the midst of an increasingly immense 
pressure, the police then set Ahok as a suspect 
on November 26, 2016. However, Ahok did not 
detained by the police. The protesters then 
compared to the government's treatment of 
Ahok to the treatment of other blasphemer in 
the past, such as Lia Eden and Arswendo who 
were immediately detained. They demanded the 
same treatment to Ahok. The demand was 
realized through the third The Defence Islam 
Action that held in Monas area on December 2, 
2016, or known as the Act of 212. The 
demonstration was greater than ever. The 
attendees were millions from across the region 
of Indonesia. Although the police have sought to 
anticipate the number of participants, the 
protesters imposed their will. The group from 
Ciamis and Bogor even went to Jakarta on foot as 
the police gave no recommendation to the bus 
company to provide the transportation facility. 
The police effort unintendedly had increased the 
sympathy of the action. In the midst of 
widespread insistence, President Jokowi and 
Jusuf Kalla eventually attend Friday prayers in 
Monas where the lector was Habib Riziq, the high 
priest of FPI. The mass action was running well 
and successfully urged the Police to promise in 
resolving Ahok case. 
In line with the widespread protests against 
Ahok for alleged blasphemy, Ahok-Djarot very 
disturbed by many acts of the refusal acts of their 
visit campaigns. Ahok-Djarot casted a complaint, 
because the refusal act was indicated conducted 
systematically to harm them. On the other hand, 
the survey results showed electability of Ahok-
Djarot tends to decline after the Defence Islam 
Action on 4 November 2016. The results of a 
survey carried by Indonesia Survey Institute 
(Lembaga Survei Indonesia), led by Denny JA 
stated that Ahok electability has decreased every 
month. In March 2016 their electability slumped 
to 59.3 percent in July to 49.1 percent, 31.4 
percent in October, and 24.6 percent in 
November [30]. The survey states that 89 
percent of Jakarta residents recognize this 
defamation case, but as much as 73.2 percent of 
respondents said that the speech of Ahok in 
Kepulauan Seribu was a slip tongue that could 
happen to anybody. Although electability Ahok 
decreased, he was still in the highest compared 
to other candidates who tend to stagnate, 
namely Agus-Sylviana as much as 20.9 percent 
and 20 percent Anies-Sandiaga.  A total of 34.5 
percent respondent stated as undecided and 
potential as swing voters (24). Ahok-Djarot was 
also still the strongest candidate in 2017 
gubernatorial based on the level of satisfaction 
survey results conducted by the Indonesian 
Poltracking Survey Institute that as many as 52.5 
percent said they are satisfied with the 
performance of Ahok as governor. Jakarta 
residents also said they were pleased with the 
development undertaken by Ahok. The levels of 
health care more affordable, educational services 
with Jakarta Smart Card was also get better, and 
the construction of infrastructure or public 
facilities were increased [31]. However, Ahok 
chance to continue his rule in the second period 
would be vanished if he was in custody. 
The crisscrossing between religious and 
political sentiments have changed the dynamics 
of politics in the context of Jakarta Gubernatorial 
Election, national politics, and the repositioning 
of Islamic groups in the national politics. One 
significant political repositioning was the return 
of Setya Novanto as the Chairman of DPR, which 
become a public question since he tripped in a 
case of profiteering Jokowi name in a secret 
negotiation on government projects in 2015. 
Both Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla showed anger 
toward Novanto at that time. As a result of public 
pressure, he finally resigned as the chairman of 
DPR in December 2015. However, long before 
the pressure on government by the Defence 
Islam Action, Golkar Party under Novanto 
continued to provide political support for Jokowi. 
Golkar Party even become the first party to 
declare Jokowi as a presidential candidate for 
2019 election. Not long after the meeting 
between Jokowi and Novanto amid of the 
Defence Islam Action pressure, Golkar Party got 
Chairman of DPR position back to Novanto which 
was formerly held by Ade Komarudin. The 
substitution of chairman of DPR was believed to 
strengthen the Golkar Party support to the 
government. In relation to the Ahok case, there 
were internal frictions in Golkar Party because 
party's decision to support Ahok in Jakarta 
gubernatorial election in 2017. The youth faction 
of Golkar party and a few elites showed their 
opposition stance to the party's decision. 
However, Jokowi government required the full 
support of Golkar Party, who has 91 seats in DPR, 
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to assure political stability and Novanto seems to 
be the right person inflate the task.  
On the other hand, the movement of the 
Defence Islam Action has led hardliner Islamic 
group's leaders to be popular. They include Habib 
Rizieq Shihab from FPI and Bachtiar Nasir from 
the Indonesia Council of Intellectual and Young 
Ulema (MIUI), who organized a movement 
organization called GNPF-MUI. Habib Rizieq, a 
controversial figure due to his association with 
violence and hard speech, eventually appeared 
as a prominent Islamic mass leader on the 
national stage. With their actions, some Islamic 
civil society increasingly enthusiastic, which they 
call for and support the leader from Islamic-
based. Islamic groups and civil organizations no 
longer simply act as the supporting components 
for the certain party and government, but has 
begun to show the potency to build democracy 
based on Islamic mass power in the future of 
Indonesia. 
 
CONCLUSION  
In the post-2014, Jokowi administration not 
only face the problem of consolidation of political 
elites, but also face the increasingly thickening 
critical mass to the government. The critical mass 
mainly comes from Islamic groups or 
communities that since the early Jokowi’s period 
were less embraced because of ideological 
bearer that PDIP has. Although Jokowi and Jusuf 
Kalla has sought to build trust with NU and 
Muhammadiyah as a representation of 
Indonesia's largest Islamic civil organizations, it 
turns out that the effort to dilute suspicion of 
Islamic groups to the regime was not enough. 
The Defence Islam Action that occurs three 
times in October, November and December 
proved that the strength of Islamic groups is still 
significant to the dynamics of national politics. 
The pressure exerted by various Islamic civil 
organizations at least had cause the government 
work agenda disturbed. Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla 
repeatedly make the political safari to ensure the 
solidity of the political support. In other words, 
Islamic civil organizations play the role as a 
counterweight to the state power that has been 
perceived as opposing their values. They can urge 
the government without presenting anarchist 
action, although they have the possible amount 
of mass to make chaos. Moreover, during this 
time the groups involved in the protests are 
tended to criticize the regime long before the 
blasphemy case. That phenomenon proves that 
the Islamic organizations in Indonesia were able 
to do a civil movement that is consistent with 
democratic principles. They keep making the 
nationalism as the prominent value on the basis 
of love of their religion. Perhaps no country has 
succeeded to apply the interface between 
nationalism and religiosity like Indonesia. Islamic 
groups in Indonesia can combine nationalism and 
religion in a harmonious relationship. 
But on the other hand, the political impact 
caused by the Defence Islam Action cannot be 
denied. Islamic civil society movement as occurs 
in the Defence Islam Action could, intentionally 
or not, give the political advantages to the 
opposing candidate as indicated by a decrease of 
Ahok electability. The impact is also seen in the 
context of national politics, as reflected in their 
return of Novanto as the DPR chairman. 
President Jokowi increasingly sought to 
strengthen political consolidation with various 
parties, both friends and foe. The political 
tension around Ahok case also shows that the 
regime has not come out of the problem of 
political consolidation that fought during the 
two-year rule. Jokowi, who had insisted the slim 
and unconditional government coalition, has 
built a political power bloc that difficult to 
disbursed. On top of all these phenomena, The 
Islam Defence Action movement implies that 
religious sentiment still interacts with the politics 
and could intensely shape Indonesia democracy 
transition in the post 2014. 
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